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I The title of this article is a play on the lyrics from "Take Me Home, Country Roads." JOHN
DENVER, Take Me Home, Country Roads, on POEMS, PRAYERS, AND PROMISES (RCA 1971).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conley2 is out, and Twombly 3-Iqbale is in. Conley's "no set of facts"
standard, which has been the heart of federal pleading doctrine for fifty years,
has been retired. Twombly and Iqbal raise the threshold test for evaluating the
sufficiency of a complaint in federal courts. A complaint now must state more
than a legally sufficient claim; it must also disclose a nonconclusory, plausible
entitlement to relief.
Federal judges, academics, and Congress followed the usual model of
grief through the five stages of loss.' Some courts and academics denied that
Twombly changed anything, insisting that Conley was still viable.6 Others wres-
tled with the Twombly decision and challenged its institutional competence to
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("the Federal Rules").7 One court
bargained with Twombly, calling it a "flexible standard."8  A few academics
lamented the loss of Conley, announcing the death of notice pleading and access
to the courts.9 But in the wake of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, federal courts have had to
accept Twombly.10
2 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (overruled in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.").
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (holding that Twombly ap-
plies to all claims within the scope of Rule 8, not just anti-trust claims).
See ELISABETH KUBLER-Ross & DAVID KESSLER, ON GRIEF AND GRIEVING: FINDING THE
MEANING OF GRIEF THROUGH THE FIVE STAGES 7 (2005). The five stages of grief are denial, an-
ger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Id. Of course, it is a fanciful notion that academics
and courts could have comparable reactions to the type of grieving envisioned by Kfibler-Ross and
Kessler, but the variety of reactions demand a means of classification, and loss is appropriate in
light of the thesis of this article.
6 See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change after Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117 (2007) ("Twombly changed antitrust law by mod-
ifying the elements of an antitrust conspiracy claim, but did not rework pleading rules across the
board.").
7 See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115 111th Cong. (2009); 155 CONG. REc. S7891 (daily ed.
July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter); Matthew A. Josephson, Some Things Are Better
Left Said: Pleading Practice After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REv. 867, 900
(2008).
8 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (overruled by Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953).
9 A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431-33 (2008) ("Notice
pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading. .. . [Plausibility pleading] is an unwarranted
interpretation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into
court.") (footnote omitted).
10 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
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Prior to Twombly-Iqbal, the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)"
practically tested only the legal sufficiency of a complaint in what has been
called "notice pleading."l 2 The standard governing the motion to dismiss was
articulated in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Conley,13 where a
complaint could survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "unless it
appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in sup-
port of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 4 Based on this language, a
complaint would have to satisfy both a legal and a factual test to state a claim
that would entitle the pleader to relief. As a legal test, a complaint had to bring
to the defendant's attention a claim for which the law would provide a remedy.
For example, a complaint would fail the legal test if it sought a remedy on the
basis of a claim that is missing an element or does not exist at law. In contrast,
as a factual test, Conley presumed the truth of all facts in the complaint except
those facts that were so inconceivable that "no set of facts" exists that could
prove the claim for relief.15 By setting the pleader's burden at conceivability,
Conley thus assured that the motion to dismiss would be primarily a legal test,
not a factual test, of complaints.
Since 2007, federal pleading doctrine has undergone a shift, arguably
backward, away from notice pleading and in the direction of fact pleading.
Whereas the Conley standard was primarily a legal test, under Twombly-Iqbal,
the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim imports a requirement to plead
factual matter that satisfies a heightened factual test.16 To satisfy that factual
test, a complaint must pass two filters. First, allegations based upon nothing
more than a threadbare recitation of the elements of a claim are deemed "con-
clusory" and not entitled to a presumption of truth.17 Any conclusory allega-
tions are removed from the complaint. Second, the remaining allegations are
weighed to determine whether they demonstrate a plausible entitlement to re-
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1202
(3d ed. 2004).
13 At least, as argued by the majority in Twombly, the quoted language in Conley "puzzl[ed]
the profession" and affected the analysis of such motions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. Neverthe-
less, critics point out that some courts never followed the quoted language from Conley literally.
See, e.g., Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 90, 112 (2009) (cit-
ing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Nonetheless, as
this court has recognized, Conley has never been interpreted literally.")).
14 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
15 The Twombly opinion implicitly acknowledged that conceivability was the standard that
courts were following under Conley because Twombly changed the standard from conceivability
to plausibility. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ("Because the plaintiffs have not nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.").
16 Id. at 556-63.
17 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) ("[T]he tenet that a court must
accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to the threadbare recitals of a cause of
action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.").
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lief.'8 Plaintiffs must nudge their complaints across the line from conceivable to
plausible.19 Any allegations that do not cross that threshold are removed from
the complaint. Then, a judge evaluates the surviving allegations to determine
whether what remains is legally sufficient to state a claim. For example, a neg-
ligence complaint may identify all the elements of a legal claim, but it may be
dismissed if, for example, the alleged breach of the standard of care is conclu-
sory, or if an alleged cause of the complainant's injury is implausible.
Although Iqbal may have secured Conley's retirement in federal
courts,20 it remains to be seen what will become of Conley among state courts.
Some states failed to adopt a version of the Federal Rules in the first instance.2 1
Other states adopted the rules but failed to adopt Conley.2 2 Among the states
that adopted both the Federal Rules and Conley, some have followed the federal
courts to retire the "no set of facts" standard,2 3 and others have rejected it. 24
Most have failed to take a position, and West Virginia falls into this category.2 5
States will have to consider the competing policy interests at issue in consider-
ing the Twombly decision. The Twombly court made it clear that the retirement
of Conley was made necessary by the rising costs of discovery and its abuse.26
To remedy this problem, Twombly-Iqbal pleading better protects societal re-
sources from meritless claims by shifting some of the focus in litigation from
discovery to pleadings.27 But judicial efficiency comes at a price. A factual test
in early stages of litigation presents a new barrier to discovery not only for me-
18 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ("Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact pleading of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.").
19 Id. ("Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceiva-
ble to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.").
20 After Iqbal, there is no likely judicial means to return to the Conley standard, but see pend-
ing legislation before Congress cited infra at note 188.
21 See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEv. L.J. 354
(2003), for a discussion of states which failed to adopt a version of the Federal Rules, as well as
states which adopted a version of the Federal Rules but maintained the prior practice for plead-
ngs.
22 Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (providing a list of states
which followed Conley as of 2007) with Oakley, supra note 21 (providing a list of states which
adopted the Federal Rules).
23 See lannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008); Sisney v. Best Inc.,
754 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (S.D. 2008); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 929 (Del. 2007).
24 See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 346 (Ariz. 2008); Colby v. Umbrella,
Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1087 (Vt. 2008) (rejecting Twombly insofar as it changes the pleading stan-
dard).
25 See infra Part IV. In Part IV, this Note will argue that the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has yet to take a position and that, while the court's language shows an increasing affec-
tion for rejecting Twombly-Iqbal, it has nonetheless failed to strike a definitive blow.
26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59.
27 See Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 S. CT. ECON. REv. 39 (2008).
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ritless claims but for legitimate claims as well, running the risk of over-
deterrence. States will also have to consider Twombly-Iqbal pleading in light of
the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules to decide whether the Court's new plead-
ing standard comports with notions of fairness and to assure that procedure re-
mains the "hand-maid rather than [the] mistress of justice."28
When the debate is settled, will the impact of Twombly-Iqbal be isolated
to the federal judiciary, or will it revolutionize procedure throughout the country
by vanquishing Conley everywhere? The answer lies in state courts which have
adopted a version of the Federal Rules and Conley in the past but have yet to
decide whether to adopt the Twombly standard. Whether Twombly-Iqbal will
rise to the next level depends upon the judicial response in state courts like the
West Virginia. Supreme Court, which have yet to address this question. It is
therefore "only a matter of time" before the issue confronts the West Virginia
Supreme Court.29 When it does, will the West Virginia Supreme Court adopt
Twombly-Iqbal, or will the country roads take West Virginians home to Conley?
This Note will examine that question in three Parts. In Part II, this Note
will explore the development of pleading doctrine under the Federal Rules be-
fore the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. In Part III, this Note will consider the
Twombly and Iqbal opinions and judicial, academic, and federal legislative res-
ponses. Finally, in Part IV, this Note will analyze state court responses to
Twombly-Iqbal, specifically the West Virginia Supreme Court's response, to
conclude that while the West Virginia Supreme Court may not have completely
buried Twombly-Iqbal, Twombly-Iqbal pleading is not suited to West Virginia's
system of justice; therefore, it should not be adopted.
II. PRE-TwOMBLY-IQBAL HISTORY OF PLEADING
A. Common Law Pleading and Code Pleading
Pleadings serve four functions: they (1) provide notice to a defendant of
the nature of a plaintiff's claim, (2) state facts, (3) narrow the issues, and (4)
promote judicial efficiency.3 0 Pleading regimes emphasized varying aspects of
these four functions throughout the history and development of pleadings. The
development of pleading regimes may be understood as a history of intergenera-
28 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938).
29 See Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-236 (W. Va. July 26, 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissent-
ing), available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/docs/Springl0/34805d2.htm.
I suspect it will be only a matter of time before this Court is confronted with
the issue of whether West Virginia should adopt an interpretation of our Rules
of Civil Procedure akin to that of the United States Supreme Court and should
change our standard for dismissing a pleading under Rules 8(a) and (e), and
12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.
30 WRIGHT, supra note 12.
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tional reactions; succeeding generations of pleading regimes reflected a re-
sponse to perceived problems with the immediately prior pleading regimes.
Common law pleadings emphasized narrowing the issues.3' Through a
highly "scientific" process, parties would plead issues back and forth, dispens-
ing insufficient claims with demurrer and dispensing issues of law before the
judge first, until finally only issues of fact remained for the trier. "The whole
grand scheme was premised on the assumption that by proceeding through a
maze of rigid, and often numerous, stages of denial, avoidance, or demurrer,
eventually the dispute would be reduced to a single issue of law or fact that
would dispose of the case." 3 2 The problem with common law pleading was that
it was "excruciatingly slow, expensive, and unworkable."33
Common law pleading gradually gave way to code pleading, the so-
called "Field Codes."34 Under code pleading, the emphasis shifted from nar-
rowing the issues to stating facts.3 5 Rather than engage in a back-and-forth con-
test to parse out the issues, code pleading required a "statement of the facts con-
stituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repeti-
tion, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended." 3 6 The plaintiffs task was to state the facts constituting
a cause of action without pleading evidence and without stating conclusions.3 7
In contrast, the defendant's task was easy: a general denial was sufficient. The
defendant did not have to provide even minimal notice to the plaintiff of the
nature of the defenses. 38 Code pleading proved problematic because the distinc-
tions between facts, evidence, and conclusions were merely of degree, not
kind.39 The West Virginia legislature followed the code pleading regime and
shared the same frustrations that challenged most courts.40
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Code pleading" is also commonly
known as the "Field Code" named after David Dudley Field, who authored the "highly influential
New York Code of 1848." Id. at 574.
3s WRIGHT, supra note 12.
36 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting An Act to Simplify and Abridge
the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y.
Laws pp. 497, 521).
3 WRIGHT, supra note 12.
38 Id. (citing Thomas E. Skinner, Pre-Trial and Discovery Under the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure, 9 ALA. L.REv. 202, 204 (1957)).
3 Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that
it is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among 'ultimate facts,' 'evi-
dence,' and 'conclusions.' Essentially any allegation in a pleading must be an
assertion that certain occurrences took place. The pleading spectrum, passing
from evidence through ultimate facts to conclusions, is largely a continuum
varying only in the degree of particularity with which the occurrences are de-
scribed.
172 [Vol. 113
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B. The Adoption of Rule 8(a) (2)
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules was adopted in response to the failures of
code pleading.41 Because of the confusion bred by requiring parties to plead
facts under code pleading, the Federal Rules shifted the development of facts in
litigation from pleadings to discovery.42 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules empha-
sized notice, not defining the issues or the facts, earning the label "notice plead-
ing.' A
While the clear emphasis of Rule 8 is upon providing notice, the degree
to which pleadings under Rule 8 perform other functions has been unclear since
it was drafted. The Federal Rules were drafted by an Advisory Committee, ap-
pointed by the United States Supreme Court on June 3, 1935 to prepare and
submit a draft of the Federal Rules.44 Judge Charles E. Clark was designated as
Id. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting
Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 520-21 (1957)). Also adding to the difficulty of code
pleading and the common law that preceded it was the disjunction of law and equity, commonly
giving way to different procedures. Compare Order Promulgating Rules of Practice for the Courts
of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 629 (1912), amended by 268 U.S. 709 (1925), also
amended by 281 U.S. 773 (1930), also amended by 286 U.S. 570 (1932) (governing federal courts
of equity), with The Conformity Act, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (codified at
28 U.S.C. 724 (1934)) (repealed 1948) (governing federal courts of law).
40 MARLYN E. LUGAR & LEE SILVERSTEIN, W. VA. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 73-74 (The
Michie Company 1960). Lugar and Silverstein note in particular that, while there were statutory
reforms to code pleading, "the fundamentals remained very much the same as under the Virginia
Code of 1849." Id. at 73. Lugar and Silverstein particularly highlight the inconsistency of the
effect of "pleading the general issue," e.g., "not guilty," depending upon the form of action. Id. at
74. For example, a statute of limitations defense was properly within the general issue for eject-
ment but not trover or assumpsit. Id.
41 WRIGHT, supra note 12.
42 Id.
43 See id. ("Because the only function left exclusively to the pleadings by the federal rules is
that of giving notice, federal courts frequently have said that the rules have adopted a system of
'notice pleading."'); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival ofFact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 451 (1986) ("Whatever the earlier function of pleadings,
the stated modern justification is limited to notice."); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 ("Such
simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other
pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.
A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002) (referring to the system of "notice pleading."). Academics now
debate whether the pleading regime post Twombly-Iqbal should properly be called notice plead-
ing. Compare Spencer, supra note 9, at 431 ("Notice pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility
pleading.") (footnote omitted) with Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 1063, 1098 (2009) ("[T]he [Twombly] standard does not represent a deviation from tradi-
tional notice pleading.").
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1004
(3d ed. 2004).
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the Reporter for the original Advisory Committee.4 5 Judge Clark, in particular,
espoused a liberal perspective on procedural reform, believing that cases should
be decided on their merits and not on the basis of procedural technicalities. 46
While the resulting Federal Rules brought about a new regime of proce-
dure, the provisions were drawn from a variety of other sources and preexisting
practices. 47 The language from Rule 8 was adapted from the language in code
pleading, particularly the phrase "facts constituting the cause of action."
"Facts" was qualified by the phrase, "[al short and plain statement of the facts,"
and "cause of action" was changed to "[a] claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief."4 8 By changing the language, the Advisory Committee in-
tended to avoid the distinctions among "evidentiary facts," "ultimate facts," and
"conclusions," as well as the confusion of proving a "cause of action" under
code pleading. 49 Hence, under Rule 8, a pleading must contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . ...
Yet, it is unclear whether Rule 8 instituted a regime of pure "notice
pleading," that is, a rule whereby the only function of pleading is notice and no
factual matter is required.5 1 Much of Judge Clark's rhetoric at that time indi-
cated a clear intent to adopt such a system of notice pleading. 52 Judge Clark
indicated that the Advisory Committee did not intend the pleadings to supply
proof or evidence, but rather, to distinguish the case from all others on the
record and "to serve as a basis for the binding force of the judgment."53 How-
ever, with the idea of "notice pleading" floating around the academic ether, the
45 Id. The Supreme Court has called Charles E. Clark "the principal draftsman of the [Federal]
Rules." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575 (quoting Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U.S. 271, 283 (1988)).
46 See Clark, supra note 28.
47 See WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 1201.
48 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
49 WRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 1202.
so FED. R. Cly. P. 8(a)(2).
5' Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685
(1998) ("Prior to the line of lower court cases that culminated in Conley v. Gibson, it was quite
possible to interpret Rule 8's requirement of a 'short and plain' statement to require, in essence, a
detailed narrative in ordinary language .... .").
52 See Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9
NEV. L.J. 1, 12-13 (2008) (quoting Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 450 (1936)).
[T]he old requirement that a party must plead only facts, avoiding evidence on
the one hand and law on the other, was logically indefensible, since the actual
distinction is at most one of degree only and in actual practice it caused more
confusion than any possible worth it might have as admonition.
Id.
5 Id. (citing AM. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 40-46 (1939))
[hereinafter WASHINGTON INSTITUTE].
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Advisory Committee notably failed to include that phrase in the rules. Moreo-
ver, Judge Clark observed that Rule 8 was susceptible to interpretation about the
degree of detail pleadings would require and that his views might "be consi-
dered rather extreme," even to members of the Advisory Committee.54 When
asked whether Rule 8 does away with the rule on pleading "ultimate facts,"
Judge Clark responded that good pleading would call for such general fact
pleading, but a plaintiff would not be "hung, drawn, and crucified" for failing to
follow the rule. 5 Judge Clark nevertheless maintained that some factual matter
would be required, at least enough to satisfy the model on the former Form 9.56
Adding to the confusion, however, Judge Clark later argued that "notice plead-
ing," in its pure sense," is not the prevailing idea among the judiciary. Rather,
he argued, the prevailing idea among the judiciary is only a moderate form of
notice pleading, one that requires the pleader to state facts upon which the claim
is based. The Federal Rules, according to Judge Clark, are an example of such
a form of moderate notice pleading.59 Thus, it might be argued that even Judge
Clark did not believe that the Federal Rules required courts to administer a re-
gime of liberal notice pleading. Instead, it may have simply permitted courts to
adopt liberal notice pleading judicially.
While the Advisory Committee intended to require a degree of factual
matter in pleading, it is unclear how much. Form 11, formerly Form 9 in the
official forms, 60 contains a very short statement of the facts, to wit: "On date, at
place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff."61
In discussing former Form 9, Judge Clark noted that the lesser allegation, "I am
suing 'X' because he caused me injury by negligence," would not suffice under
54 Id. (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES,
CLEVELAND, OHIO 220 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter CLEVELAND INSTITUTE]).
ss Id. (quoting CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, supra note 54 at 230-31).
56 See id. at 14 (quoting WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, supra note 53, at 69); see also FED. R. Civ.
P. APP. FORM 11. Former Form 9 is now Form 11.
5 Campbell, supra note 52, at 15-16 (quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CODE PLEADING § 38, at 240 (2d ed. 1947)) (arguing that "notice pleading" requires only "a very
general reference to the happening out of which the case arose" without a need to "state the details
of the cause of action").
5 Id. at 16.
59 Id. Judge Clark also called pure notice pleading "a nice hopeful thing," but he urged that it
"isn't anything that we can use with any precision." Marcus, supra note 43, at 451 (citing Charles
E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYo. L.J. 177, 181 (1958)). However, Marcus
points out that other scholars have argued that Judge Clark's views about pleading changed with
time after the enactment of the Federal Rules, representing a political retreat. Id. at n. 113 (citing
Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE
L.J. 914, 925-26 (1976)).
60 See FED. R. Civ. P. 84 ("The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate
the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.").
61 FED. R. Civ. P. App. FoRM 11.
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the Federal Rules.62 By a comparison of Form 11 to Judge Clark's hypothetical,
there are two types of facts that differ: first, there are the background facts-
date and place-and second, there are facts which disclose the manner of the
occurrence-"drove a motor vehicle." The pleading function of notice would
require allegations of background facts as to distinguish the claim on the record.
The manner of the occurrence, by motor vehicle, also advances the goal of no-
tice by apprising the defendant to the nature of the claim, an automobile negli-
gence claim. Of course, even Form 11 leaves room for dispute about the facts
such that it may even be unclear what legal theory is alleged.63 But, what if, for
example, the complaint identifies the background facts but does not identify the
manner of the occurrence? That is, while Form 11 satisfies the requirements of
a complaint, is there an even simpler complaint that will suffice?
C. Early Federal Opinions Interpreting Rule 8
After the Federal Rules were promulgated, courts began to ask these
questions and others. One of the early cues about what the Federal Rules re-
quired came from an opinion written by Judge Clark himself.64 In Dioguardi v.
Durning, a pro se plaintiff had two claims. First, the plaintiff alleged that on an
auction day, when the defendant sold merchandise at "public custom," "he sold
my merchandise to another bidder with my price of $110, and not of his price of
$120."65 Second, the plaintiff alleged that "three weeks before the sale, two
cases, of 19 bottles each case, disappeared." 6 6 It is unclear from the face of the
complaint what laws the plaintiff alleges were violated, particularly because
there was no citation to substantive law. Yet, Judge Clark found that the basic
facts alleged in the complaint gave rise to an inference that the plaintiff and the
defendant were in a dispute about whether Dioguardi or his consignor in Italy
owed money due on the import of medical tonics. 67 Thus understood, the alle-
gation that the defendant sold to another bidder at the plaintiffs price implies
that the defendant violated the rules for public auction of unclaimed merchan-
dise under 19 U.S.C. § 1491.68 Further, the allegation about disappearing bot-
tles disclosed a claim against the defendant for conversion. 69 Judge Clark con-
62 Campbell, supra note 52, at 14 (quoting WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, supra note 53, at 69).
63 There are many possible factual variations because there is factual ambiguity in the use of
the phrase "against the plaintiff." It is unclear whether the defendant was in a vehicle collision
(which is probably what the drafters had in mind), a vehicle collision with a pedestrian on a side-
walk, or if the defendant was driving the plaintiff s vehicle and negligently damaged it. The fac-
tual discrepancy would implicate different legal theories and defenses.
6 See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 775.
69 Id
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cluded that the complaint should not be dismissed under the Federal Rules be-
cause "however inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his
claims . . ..
Judge Clark's opinion in Dioguardi had a significant impact on the de-
velopment of the pleading regime. Reading Judge Clark's opinion in Dioguar-
di, it appears that the Advisory Committee intended to require only a minimal
amount of factual matter, only enough to disclose a claim when aided by infe-
rences to be drawn from the complaint.n In response to the Dioguardi opinion,
there was a movement to amend Rule 8 to reinstate the code pleading language
of "facts constituting the cause of action., 72 Nevertheless, the 1955 Advisory
Committee rejected the call to amend Rule 8, arguing that there was a "pletho-
ra" of circumstances, occurrences, and events alleged in the Dioguardi com-
plaint that disclose the nature of what happened.7 3 Accordingly, while the Advi-
sory Committee notes in 1955 were not officially adopted,7 4 the opinion in Dio-
guardi has garnered the endorsement of a subsequent Advisory Committee as a
sufficient complaint for purposes of Rule 8.
D. The Apex ofLiberal Pleading: Conley v. Gibson15
After nearly twenty years following the promulgation of the Federal
Rules, the United States Supreme Court finally provided a standard to test the
sufficiency of fact matter contained within a complaint in Conley v. Gibson.76 It
all began with a complaint alleging discrimination under the Railway Labor
Act.7 7 The plaintiffs, African-American members of the Brotherhood of Rail-
way and Steamship Clerks, alleged that their collective bargaining agent discri-
minated against them in negotiations by not giving them representation compa-
rable to that of white members of the union. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that
the Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to protect them
against these discriminatory discharges and refused to give
them protection comparable to that given white employees. The
70 Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775.
71 However, it is also possible that Judge Clark was articulating a rule for the Second Circuit
and not for Rule 8 generally. See Marcus, supra note 43 (noting that Judge Clark believed that
Rule 8 gave judges discretion about the amount of detail required).
72 See WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 1201.
7 See id. at § 1201 n.11.
74 See id. at § 1201.
5 Conley, 355 U.S. at 41.
76 Id. at 45-46.
Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188)
(1996)).
78 Conley, 355 U.S. at 42-43.
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complaint then went on to allege that the Union had failed in
general to represent Negro employees equally and in good
faith. 9
The defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, among them ju-
risdiction and failure to state a claim.80 The district court and the circuit court
on appeal affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of jurisdiction,
without addressing whether the complaint failed to state a claim. 8  After revers-
ing the dismissal on grounds of jurisdiction, the Court took the initiative to ad-
dress whether the complaint stated a claim for relief.82
The Court addressed the proper standard upon which to review the fac-
tual sufficiency of a complaint, saying, "[i]n appraising the sufficiency of the
complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."8 3 The defendants claimed that "the complaint failed to set forth
specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination . . . ."84 But the
Court responded that the Federal Rules
do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require
is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to
the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified "notice
pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity for dis-
covery and the other pretrial procedures established by the
Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and de-
fense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.
Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that "all pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice," we have no doubt
79 Id. at 43.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 43-44.
82 Id. at 44-45.
8 Id. at 45-46 (citing Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940);
Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 774; Cont'l Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3rd Cir. 1942)). The Lei-
mer court held, "[W]e think there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of
statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim." Leimer, 108 F.2d at 306.
The Shober court held that a complaint should not be dismissed "except where it appears to a
certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of the claim." Shober, 130 F.2d at 635. However, Judge Clark's opinion in
Dioguardi does not explicitly reference a "no set of facts" or "any set of facts" standard.
8 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
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that petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave
the respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject
the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one mis-
step by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits.
In the above quoted language, the Court articulated two important
points of law. First, because a complaint will suffice if the functional purpose
of notice is satisfied, the Court endorsed the Federal Rules as an embodiment of
"notice pleading." Second, the working standard for factual sufficiency on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is that the complaint will not be
dismissed unless there is "no set of facts" which would entitle the plaintiff to
relief. That is, a claim would be sustained unless it is impossible for a plaintiff
to prove the claim, sustaining any complaint that could conceivably be proven.
On this ground, the Conley Court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs com-
plaint.86
Conley represents the apex of liberal pleading within the federal system.
Because the only purpose of the complaint was notice, the plaintiff need only
plead enough facts to provide notice of the nature of the claim. Because a com-
plaint did not need to constitute a prima facie showing of a cause of action, it
was not necessary to identify all elements of the claim as long as the court could
draw an inference from the complaint that the element was satisfied. Further,
the complaint did not need to identify or intend to identify a sustainable theory
of liability as long as the elements of such a theory could be inferred from the
face of the complaint.8 8 Finally, any complaint that stated a conceivable right to
relief was sufficient.
III. JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO CONLEY: THE REVIVAL OF FACT PLEADING AND
TWOMBLY
A. The Revival ofFact Pleading: Judicially Heightened Pleading
Conley settled the debate about the applicable pleading standard under
Rule 8 for twenty years. 89 But federal courts began to believe that filings esca-
lated throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and that the cost of discovery allowed the
threat of discovery to arm plaintiffs with a strong hand for negotiating settle-
85 Id. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
86 Id. at 48.
87 WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 1216 ("Pleadings need not state with precision all elements that
give rise to a legal basis for recovery as long as fair notice of the nature of the action is pro-
vided.").
88 Id.
89 Marcus, supra note 43, at 434.
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ments.90 The Supreme Court itself argued that discovery was increasingly used
as a threat to increase a plaintiffs bargaining position.9' Whether the courts
were accurate in believing that the system was overrun with abusive suits has
been subject to much scholarly debate,92 but it is undisputed that this belief gave
rise to a judicial movement, what Professor Marcus has called "[t]he [r]evival of
[flact [p]leading."93
Armed with the belief that abusive, frivolous complaints were crowding
federal dockets, federal judges began to require heightened pleadings for certain
types of claims, like civil rights claims. 94 For example, the Fifth Circuit re-
quired plaintiffs in § 1983 actions to include a high degree of particularity in
their pleadings.95 The United States Supreme Court responded in 1993 by re-
jecting the Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading standard for § 1983 claims alleg-
ing municipal liability.9 6 However, federal courts proved anxious to limit the
breadth of the Court's opinion to municipal liability in civil rights.97
90 See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (abrogation
recognized by Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004)). The court stated,
In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of cases brought
under the Civil Rights Act. A substantial number of these cases are frivolous
or should be litigated in the State courts; they all cause defendants public offi-
cials, policemen and citizens alike, considerable expense, vexation and per-
haps unfounded notoriety. It is an important public policy to weed out the fri-
volous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and still keep
the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims.
Id. (quoting Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1276 (3d Cir. 1970)).
91 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742 (1975).
92 Many scholars urge that the courts' fears were well founded. Professor Marcus observed,
"The result of this synergy was a litigation industry in which the value of litigation appeared only
slightly connected to the merits of claims being asserted-a 'gigantic slot machine' approach to
litigation in which the status of being a defendant overshadowed the merits of the underlying
dispute." Marcus, supra note 43, at 442-43. On the other hand, scholars such as Linda S. Mulle-
nix have urged that the rise of abusive suits is but a myth. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REv. 683, 684-85 (1998) (arguing
that empirical studies show that there has been no increase in discovery events throughout the life
of the Federal Rules and that evidence suggesting otherwise is merely anecdotal).
9 Marcus, supra note 43, at 444-51.
94 See, e.g., Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 922; Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646
(9th Cir. 1984); Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1989).
9 See Rodriguez, 871 F.2d at 554. The court reasoned,
In view of the enormous expense involved today in litigation, however, of the
heavy cost of responding to even a baseless legal action, and of Rule 11 's new
language requiring reasonable inquiry into the facts of the case by an attorney
before he brings an action, applying the stated rule to all § 1983 actions has
much to recommend it.
Id. (emphasis in original).
96 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993).
97 Spencer, supra note 9, at 437-38.
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The United States Supreme Court once again admonished federal courts
to stop crafting judicial exceptions to Rule 8 in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA. 9 8
The Second Circuit required plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination to
allege all the elements of a prima facie claim, including circumstances sufficient
to give rise to an inference of discrimination.99 But the Supreme Court rejected
the Second Circuit's standard, saying that "prima facie" is an evidentiary stan-
dard, not a pleading requirement. 00 Ultimately, the Court held that complaints
generally do not need to satisfy a heightened pleading standard, and the excep-
tions are specifically listed in Rule 9(b).'o' Thus, the Court sent a strong mes-
sage that heightened pleading would only apply to the claims listed in Rule 9(b)
and simplified notice pleading would apply to everything else.102
But while the Supreme Court seemingly closed the door on the revival
of fact pleading, the perceptions that gave rise to the judicial trend persisted.
Once again armed with the belief in costly modem litigation, rising meritless
claims, and increases in court filings, 0 3 the Supreme Court retired Conley's "no
set of facts" language in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.104
98 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
99 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509 (citing Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 35-36, 38 (2d Cir.
2000); Austin v. Ford Models, Inc., 149 F.3d 148, 152-153 (2d Cir. 1998)).
100 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511. The Court also implied once again that the Federal Rules
follow a regime of "notice pleading." See id. ("In addition, under a notice pleading system, it is
not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case because the
McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination case.").
101 Id. at 513. While the exceptions are listed in Rule 9(b), the Court significantly fails to say
that the only exceptions are in Rule 9(b). Judicially-created exceptions to Rule 8(a)(2) are not
gone (although their use may be unnecessary in light of Twombly-Iqbal). The Court cites Lea-
therman for the classic rule of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, reasoning that
because employment discrimination is not listed in Rule 9(b), the drafters did not intend for it to
be there. However, the Court came short of completely eliminating all judicially crafted excep-
tions because the Court does not unequivocally say that the only exceptions are contained within
Rule 9(b). For a discussion of heightened pleading throughout the country that survived Swier-
kiewicz, see generally Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 Auz. L. REV.
987 (2003). Nevertheless, the Court sent a strong signal that it would not lightly sustain judicial-
ly-created exceptions to Rule 8(a)(2).
102 The 2002 Swierkiewicz opinion is a relatively recent entry to the Court's pleading jurispru-
dence, and judicial exceptions to Rule 8(a)(2) continue to survive. See id. Professor Fairman has
analyzed the reality of pleading practice in federal courts and has dismissed the idea that there are
simply two regimes at play-notice pleading for Rule 8 and fact pleading for Rule 9. See id. at
989. Instead, pleading should be understood as a circular model of the degree of factual particu-
larity required. Id. Complaints stating too little (conclusory) or too much (prolix) are dismissed,
and the amount of factual detail that will suffice between those extreme varies with the cause of
action. Id.
103 Although the reasons listed here are limited to the ostensible motivation behind the Twom-
bly opinion, one more is considered here. The Supreme Court had just cut off (or at least greatly
curtailed) the federal court system's chosen method to respond to perceived docket pressure in
Swierkiewicz. Although the Court seemed to have settled the issue in Leatherman, the circuits'
creative efforts to distinguish Leatherman demonstrate the desperation for relief which gave rise
to the need for judicial forms of heightened pleading. When the Court's command failed once
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B. Conley Retired: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblyos
The story of Twombly began in 1984 when the federal government split
the local and long distance telecommunication industry. 106 The local telecom-
munication industry was left to a series of regional service providers-the Baby
Bells or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs)107-Operating pursuant to
a government-sanctioned monopoly while the Atlantic Telephone & Telegraph
Company (AT&T) was divested of its right to compete in the local telecommu-
nication industry.'08 In turn, the long distance industry was left to the competi-
tive markets. 109 But Congress withdrew the local monopolies in 1996 and re-
quired that the ILECs facilitate private entrants, Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (CLECs) 0, to the industry."'
William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus brought an action against the
big four ILECs1 2 on behalf of all local telephone subscribers in the United
States alleging that the ILECs were engaged in an unlawful anti-trust conspira-
cy. 13 In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs conspired to re-
strain trade through (1) parallel conduct and (2) unlawful agreements to keep
CLECs out of the market in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.1 14 Specifically,
the complaint alleged,
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the
[ILECs] in one another's markets, and in light of the parallel
course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent competition
from CLECs within their respective local telephone and/or high
following Leatherman, there was a strong probability that it would fail again or that courts would
find a less desirable way to seek relief Rather than wait and see, the Court came up with an alter-
native to assure that the inevitable free-fall to heightened pleading would at least be controlled.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
105 Id. at 544.
106 Id. at 549.
107 Id
108 Id.
109 Id.
no Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.
"' Id.
112 BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International, Inc., SBC Communications,
Inc., and Verizon Communications, Inc., successor-in-interest to Bell Atlantic Corporation. To-
gether, the Baby Bells controlled approximately 90% of the local telecommunication industry in
the forty-eight contiguous States. Id. at 550 n. 1.
113 Id. at 550.
114 Id. at 550-51. In relevant portion, § I prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations." Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2006)).
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speed internet services markets and the other facts and market
circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information
and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their re-
spective local telephone and/or high speed internet services
markets and have agreed not to compete with one another and
otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another. 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to address the proper standard
,,11 16for pleading an anti-trust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
The Court then created a framework with which to evaluate the sufficiency of
facts within the pleadings."' 7 Within this framework, the Court identified three
categories of facts in pleadings: conclusory facts, facially neutral facts, and sug-
gestive facts." 8 Complaints must contain facts which cross two thresholds: (1)
the threshold between conclusory and facially neutral and (2) the threshold be-
tween facially neutral and suggestive."19
First, a complaint must cross the threshold from conclusory to facially
neutral. The Court held that formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of
action alone are deemed conclusory or speculative and, therefore, are not en-
titled to the presumption of truth.120 The Court stated,
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss does not need detailed factual allegations,12' a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to
relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formu-
laic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do
122 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to re-
lief above the speculative level 23 ... on the assumption that all
11s Id. at 5 51.
" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553.
" Id. at 554-56.
118 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (citing DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d
53, 56 (1st Cir. 1999)).
119 See Spencer, supra note 9, at 448 (arguing that the Supreme Court has classified three
"zones of pleading" in which only suggestive facts are sufficient).
120 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-56.
121 Id. at 555 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychia-
try & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994)).
122 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (holding that
courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.")).
123 Id. (citing WRIGHT, supra note 12 ("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than
... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.")).
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the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact) .... 124
The Court emphasized that Rule 8(a)(2) does not eliminate the requirement to
plead facts, thereby settling that the Federal Rules require pleadings to serve
functions other than notice.125
Second, a complaint must contain facts which cross the threshold
between facially neutral facts and suggestive facts. 126 Whether a fact crosses the
threshold between facially neutral and suggestive turns upon whether the fact
shows a plausible entitlement to relief under the substantive law governing the
127claim. "
The policy driving the Court's decision was sprinkled throughout the
remainder of the opinion. In particular, the Court focused upon plaintiffs'
incentive to use discovery as a tool to increase the settlement value for meritless
claims. 12 8 The Court explained that the "practical significance" of the plausibili-
ty standard is that a "largely groundless claim" could "take up the time of a
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem in-
crement of the settlement value."l 2 9 The plausibility standard gives effect to this
policy by measuring the merit of claims and dismissing claims with a low prob-
ability of success. The Court argued that the time to apply a filter for meritless
claims is at the motion to dismiss stage because that is the point of minimum
expense and exposure to litigation and therefore, most effectively destroys the
incentive to pursue meritless claims. 130 "[C]areful case management," the Court
insisted, "is no answer" because courts have not been effective at dismissing
meritless cases during discovery.131
124 Id. at 555-56 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1; Neitzke v. Wil-
liams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a
judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears "that a recovery is very remote
and unlikely")).
125 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3.
126 Id. at 556.
127 Although the definition of suggestive facts provided here is vague, it is the only generally-
applicable definition that may be read into the Twombly opinion because the Court analyzed the
meaning of "suggestive" by reference to "prior rulings and considered views of leading commen-
tators" on anti-trust law. Id. at 556. Iqbal would later clarify the meaning, but it did so without
the support of two Justices in the majority of the Twombly opinion, including the author of the
Twombly opinion. The vagueness of the Twombly decision that now strikes the reader became the
subject of a debate among even those who joined in the Twombly majority.
128 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-58. In particular, the Court examined the trend of weaponizing
discovery in anti-trust litigation. See id. at 558-59 (citing several cases and commentaries which
all suggest that anti-trust actions are particularly susceptible to discovery abuse).
129 Id. at 557-58 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
130 Id. at 558 (citing WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 233-34).
131 Id. at 559.
184 Vol. 113
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss1/11
2010] TAKE ME HOME TO CONLEY V. GIBSON, COUNTRYROADS
The Court retired Conley's "no set of facts" standard. 132 Retirement
was made necessary, the Court urged, because a literal reading of the Conley
language would sustain any claim unless it was impossible to prove, a standard
which would sustain conclusory allegations. 13 3 By implication, then, the Court
did not suggest that the Conley holding was incorrect, but rather, that it was
inartfully stated and therefore susceptible to misinterpretation. In fact, the Court
went on to cite several lower court opinions and scholars (some of which are
discussed supral34) which "correctly" interpreted Conley as a rule that could not
be read literally. But, to the Court, many courts read Conley too literally.
Therefore, the Court held,
[T]he passage so often quoted fails to mention this understand-
ing on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the profession
for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.
The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on
an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint. 3 5
The final point of law to consider (and perhaps the one subject to the
greatest ambiguity) is that the Twombly Court insisted that it was not requiring
heightened pleading.13 6
In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any "heightened"
pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished
"by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judi-
cial interpretation." 37 . . . On certain subjects understood to
raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state fac-
tual allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 re-
quires.1
Hence, the Court preserved the rule in Swierkiewicz which prohibits judicial
exceptions to Rule 8 and emphasized that its holding is to be applied generally.
132 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
133 Id. at 561-62.
134 See Hazard, supra note 51.
135 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
136 Id. at 569 n.14.
13 Id. (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)).
18Id. at 5 69 n. 14.
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In applying the procedural law, the Court searched for facts suggestive
of an entitlement to relief.139 Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a contract,
agreement, or conspiracy to restrain trade is actionable ("concerted agree-
ment"). 14 0 The allegation that the ILECs were engaged in a concerted agree-
ment is a conclusory allegation not entitled to the presumption of truth. It fails
to cross the first threshold. There are two facts that could potentially show con-
certed agreement: (1) the "absence of any meaningful competition between [the
ILECs] in one another's markets," and (2) "the parallel course of conduct that
each [ILEC] engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs."l41
First, the absence of competition is merely a neutral fact. In light of the
divestiture of the ILECs' monopolies, it was only "natural" that individual
ILECs would resist new competition pursuant to "routine market conduct."l 4 2
The plaintiffs also argued that there is a collective incentive among the ILECs to
resist competition, but each ILEC naturally would still act upon the collective
interest whether or not they had violated the Sherman Act. 14 3 The lack of com-
petition is neutral in that it fails to "nudge" the likelihood of a concerted agree-
ment from conceivable to plausible.144 As a result, it fails to cross the second
threshold.
Second, parallel conduct is also a neutral fact. Under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act, parallel conduct alone is not actionable, but concerted agreement is
actionable.14 5  Although parallel conduct may be evidence of a concerted
agreement, the Court reasoned that parallel conduct does not advance the plau-
sibility of a claim of a concerted agreement because, as the complaint itself sug-
gested, it was in the ILECs' best interest to maintain its turf, even without a
concerted agreement.146 Accordingly, parallel conduct does not show a plausi-
ble entitlement to relief and fails to cross the second threshold. Therefore, there
are no facts within the complaint suggestive of a concerted agreement, so the
Court held that the allegations failed to state a claim for relief under the Sher-
man Act, and the complaint was dismissed.147
139 Id. at 564.
140 Id. at 556-57 (holding that there must be "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest
that an agreement was made").
141 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565-66.
142 Id. at 566.
143 Id.
'" Id.
145 Id. at 553-54 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984);
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954); Brooke Grp.
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)).
146 Id. at 568. It is possible that the plaintiffs pled themselves out of court on this ground by
providing reasons which made the existence of a concerted agreement, as shown by parallel con-
duct, factually neutral.
147 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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C. Confusion in the Aftermath of Twombly
Following Twombly, pleading rules became a "hot topic" in civil proce-
dure. 148 Only two weeks after the Supreme Court "retired" Conley in Erickson
v. Pardus, the Court once again recited language from Conley and Swierkie-
wicz.149 Although the Court did not quote the "no set of facts" language from
Conley, it reiterated the old philosophy that a complaint need only provide fair
notice of the claim and its grounds, 50 and the Court must accept as true all fac-
tual allegations in the complaint.15
Twombly proved confusing to the lower courts, and Erickson did not
help. Just a few weeks after the Twombly opinion, in Iqbal v. Hasty, the Second
Circuit observed that Twombly fostered "[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning
the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings .... The Second Cir-
cuit identified factors that pointed in the direction of a new pleading standard
and factors that pointed away from a new pleading standard. 15 3
Four factors pointed toward a new standard. First, Twombly disavowed
Conley's "no set of facts" language. 15 4 Second, the Court indicated that plead-
148 Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 873 ("Pleading rules are once again a hot topic in civil procedure circles.").
149 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (Twombly was issued May 21, 2007, and Erick-
son was issued June 4, 2007).
150 Id. at 93 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
1s1 Id. at 94 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 n. 1). Although it may be tempting to suggest
that the Court was focused upon the substantive law and was casually reciting the procedural
standards, the opinion was per curiam, and the substantive law was largely a recitation of accepted
case law. See id at 90 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). It is unclear why
the Court would review such a claim if it were not adding to the Twombly case law. In this regard,
it is notable that Justice Scalia dissented from granting the petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 95.
There is a wrinkle that may help distinguish Erickson and Twombly - in Erickson, the plaintiff
was pro se. Id. at 94. William Erickson was imprisoned in Colorado, where he brought suit
against prison officials alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based upon
cruel and unusual punishment. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 89. Erickson brought a § 1983 action alleg-
ing deliberate indifference because the prison failed to administer medical treatment for a liver
condition caused by hepatitis C, thereby endangering his life. Id. at 90. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that Erickson's allegation of "cognizable harm"
was conclusory. Id. at 92. Yet the Court noted that a document filed pro se is "'to be liberally
construed,' and 'however in artfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . ."' Id. at 94 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). The Court then
held that the complaint "alone was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)." Id. While Erickson is illu-
strated here to highlight the grounds for a belief among some courts that Twombly may not be
generally applicable, a perspective that is later put to rest by Iqbal, even in light of Iqbal, this
opinion is difficult to reconcile with plausibility pleading. It is questionable, and beyond the
scope of this Note, as to whether Conley may survive as a vestige in complaints filed by pro se
litigants.
152 Hasty, 490 F.3d at 155 (overruled by Iqbal, _ U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1937).
'5 Id. at 155-57.
154 Id. at 155.
187
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ings must do more than provide notice. '5  Third, the Court rejected the alterna-
tive of "careful case management" in discovery to weed out meritless claims. 5 6
Finally, the Court liberally used some variation of the term "plausible" to
describe the proper pleading standard. 5 7
However, five factors pointed away from a new standard, suggesting
that the Twombly opinion might be limited to anti-trust or other similar types of
claims. First, the Court insisted that it would not require heightened pleading
and embraced Swierkiewicz.'58 Second, the Court approved the negligence
complaint in former Form 9, which appears to makes a conclusory allegation of
negligence.15 9 Third, because the policy underlying the Court's decision was to
subvert abusive discovery, it implied that the resulting opinion only applied to
cases with costly discovery.160 Fourth, although the Court disapproved of Con-
ley, it left undisturbed its prior case law which suggested that summary judg-
ment is the proper mechanism to weed out unmeritorious claims.' 6' Finally, the
Erickson opinion again cited Conley for the proposition that the purpose of
pleadings is to provide notice.16 2
After weighing these factors, the Second Circuit concluded that the
"essential message" from the Twombly Court was that Rule 8 should be go-
verned by a "flexible 'plausibility standard"' whereby certain claims would re-
quire amplification to demonstrate a plausible entitlement to relief.16 3
However, "the mammoth weight of the case law" from other circuits
suggested that Twombly was not limited to its "initial contextual boundaries."'64
1ss Id. at 156.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Hasty, 490 F.3d at 156.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 156-57.
161 Id. at 157.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 157-58. Some federal district court judges were reluctant to apply Twombly whole-
sale, including Judge John T. Copenhaver from the Southern District of West Virginia. See Mas-
sey Energy Co. v. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Civil Action No. 2:06-0614, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70330, at *9 n.4. (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 21, 2007) ("In [Twombly], the Supreme
Court 'address[ed] the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of
parallel conduct . . . ."'). Id. ("Although so limited, the majority opinion nevertheless contains
broader language some believe to be in tension with the settled notice pleading standards arising
from [Conley] and its progeny . . . ."); Allman v. Chancellor Health Partners, Inc., Civil Action
No. 5:08CV155, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44501, at *9 (N.D. W. Va. May 26, 2009) ("Specifically,
it is unclear whether Twombly alters the pleading standard only for complex antitrust cases or
whether it has a broader application."). Academics also questioned whether Twombly would be
applied universally. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 6, at 122 ("In sum, we must read Twombly in
the context of antitrust law . . . . 'Plausibility' is an element of a certain kind of antitrust conspira-
cy claim, not a standard for pleadings in general.").
164 Janice R. Ballard, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: Has the Court Re-Set the Bar With a Heigh-
tened Pleading Standard?, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 183, 201 (2008).
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While the Court's pronouncement of heightened pleading may have been too
equivocal for the Second Circuit, all other circuits considering the question ap-
plied Twombly outside the anti-trust context.'6 5
D. Answers in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Conley ended with a civil rights claim.166 In Iqbal, Javaid Iqbal was la-
beled a person "of high interest" by the FBI for purposes of investigating the
September 11th attacks.' 67 Iqbal brought a Bivens action against officials, alleg-
ing that "they adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected respondent to
harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national
origin."1 68 In particular, Iqbal alleged that former Attorney General Ashcroft
was the "principal architect" of such a policy, and that former FBI Director Ro-
bert Mueller "was instrumental in its adoption and execution."l 69 Under the
substantive law, a plaintiff would have to allege facts that suggest the differing
treatment was carried out "not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the pur-
pose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin."l70
The Court clarified the Twombly methodology. In determining whether
a complaint should survive a motion to dismiss, first, a court must determine
which elements must be alleged to state a claim under the substantive law.171
Second, a court must remove all allegations from the complaint that are mere
legal conclusions. 17 2 Third, a court must remove all allegations from the com-
plaint that do not state a plausible entitlement to relief in light of judicial expe-
rience and common sense. 17 3 Finally, if what remains in the complaint satisfies
the elements of a claim under the substantive law, then the pleader has stated a
sufficient claim for relief.
165 Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008); Perez-Acevedo
v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008); Giarratono v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544) (applying Twombly); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).
166 See Iqbal, 
_U.S. 
_, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1937.
167 Id. at 1939.
168 Id. at 1942.
169 Id. at 1939.
170 Id. at 1949.
' Id. at 1947.
172 Iqbal, U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. Once legal conclusions are removed, the Court
calls the remaining facts "well-pleaded facts." Id. at 1950. In response to whether plausibility
pleading was tantamount to restoration of code pleading, the Court added, "Rule 8 marks a nota-
ble and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."
Id.
173 Id.
189
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The Court illustrated the application of this standard in the Iqbal opi-
nion.174  The plaintiffs would have to plead facts suggestive of a "contract,
agreement, or conspiracy."175 The allegation that the defendants entered a con-
tract, agreement, or conspiracy is conclusory. 76  The fact that the defendants
engaged in parallel behavior does not show a plausible entitlement to relief in
light of judicial experience and common sense.17 7 Therefore, there remained no
facts from which to establish the conspiracy element of an anti-trust claim. 7 8
Turning to the Iqbal complaint, the Court first noted that the allegation
that Ashcroft and Mueller were the architect and instrument of the allegedly
invidiously motivated policy is a conclusory, formulaic recitation of the ele-
ments of a claim and not entitled to the presumption of truth.179 Second, the
Court examined two other facts: (1) the FBI arrested and detained thousands of
Arab Muslim men, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller approved the policy to hold
detainees until they are cleared. 80 But the FBI was investigating persons with a
link to Al-Qaeda, an organization only incidentally spear-headed by an Arab
Muslim. Hence, judicial experience and common sense strongly indicated to the
Court that the investigation of September 11th leads had only an incidental, not
intentional, impact on Arab Muslims.' 8 ' Instead, "[a]ll it plausibly suggests is
that the Nation's top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating
terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity."182 Therefore,
the Court held that the complaint did not nudge the plaintiffs claim across the
line from conceivable to plausible.183
The Court then addressed several lingering questions about the Twom-
bly opinion. Is it limited to anti-trust claims? No.18 4 Is the Twombly rule tem-
174 Id.
17 Id.
176 Iqbal, U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 Id. at 1951.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
183 Id. at 1950-51.
184 Id. at 1953. Specifically, the Court held,
This argument is not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of
a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation
and application of Rule 8.... That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard
'in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.' FED.
R. Civ. P. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for
'all civil actions,' . . . and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.
Id. (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 113190
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pered where discovery is cabined in such a way as to preserve a defense of qual-
ified immunity? No.'85 Does Rule 9's permission to allege intent "generally"
allow a plaintiff to make a conclusory allegation as to mental state? No.186 The
term "generally" is a lower bar than Rule 9's particularity requirement, but "[i]t
does not give him license to evade the less rigid-although still operative-
strictures of Rule 8."8
Thus, Iqbal permanently cemented Twombly as the unqualified authori-
ty for interpreting Rule 8, equally assuring that at least Conley's "no set of
facts" language will not re-emerge by judicial means.188
IV. WEST VIRGINIA SHOULD NOT ADOPT TwOMBLY-IQBAL
How will Twombly-Iqbal impact the states? Which states can provide
guidance? To understand the answers to these questions, one should consider
states which (1) adopted a replica of the Federal Rules, (2) originally embraced
Conley, (3) have yet to definitively accept or reject Twombly, and (4) have
hinted that they will consider the question by citing Twombly in majority opi-
nions in their high courts. Only one state satisfies all these criteria: West Vir-
ginia. There is no discemable trend among the states regarding adoption or re-
jection of Twombly-Iqbal, and there have been no state decisions adopting or
rejecting Twombly since the Iqbal decision. Therefore, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court is a prime candidate to be the next state court to decide which way
to go with Twombly, and its decision has the potential to set a trend toward
adoption or rejection throughout the country.1 89 This Note will argue that the
West Virginia Supreme Court should reject Twombly-Iqbal.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1954.
187 Iqbal, 
_ U.S. _,129 S. Ct. at 1954.
188 However, Congress has proposed legislation in response to Iqbal in an effort to restore
Conley. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open Access
to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). Yet, preliminary drafts of the Notice
Pleading Restoration Act have drawn criticism for being insufficient to overturn Twombly because
they merely state that the courts are to follow the standard given in Conley, which, as the Supreme
Court itself insisted, could be read as consistent with Twombly. See Bahar Dejban, Will the Notice
Pleading Restoration Act be Enough?, CONSUMER ADVOC. LEGAL UPDATE (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://www.consumeradvocatelegalupdate.com/tags/notice-pleading-restoration-ac/. In response,
the House bill explicitly provides that the "no set of facts" language shall govern and explicitly
prohibits dismissals on the basis that a claim is implausible. At this time, the Judicial Conference
has taken no interest in amending Rule 8 to overturn the Court's new precedents, arguing that
Iqbal seems to have had little impact on the number of motions to dismiss or the number of dis-
missals in general. See Dave Lenckus, Congress Eyes Pleading Standard: Some Say New Law
Will Eliminate Costly Meritless Cases, Bus. INS. (Nov. 9, 2009),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091108/ISSUE03/311089984#.
189 West Virginia also has an added peculiarity in that its Supreme Court adopts amendments to
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, so there is an essential link between rule adherence
and case adherence. See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §3 (amended 1974).
191
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A. West Virginia is a "Replica" State
It was predicted that the Federal Rules' influence on state procedure
would someday effect "one procedure for state and federal courts."190 But
"[w]here once the ideal 'one procedure for state and federal courts' was a bea-
con for procedural reform, its light has dimmed to barely a flicker."' 91 Never-
theless, "[f]ederal influence on state procedure, of course, remains substantial,
and important."' 92 While many states patterned their rules after the Federal
Rules, the degree of similarity with the Federal Rules varies greatly by state. 193
Professor Oakley has documented state court adherence to the Federal Rules,
tracking their fidelity to amendments as recently as 2003.194
As of 1986, Oakley had argued that there were twenty-three jurisdic-
tions that have true replicas of the Federal Rules.195 Three other states were not
"true replicas," but they modeled the Federal Rules and implemented a regime
of notice pleading.1 96 While Oakley ultimately concluded that there may be no
"true" replicas, save perhaps one,'97 the 1986 classifications are still useful for
purposes of this Note because Rule 8(a)(2)-the "short and plain statement"
language-has not been amended.
Under Professor Oakley's analysis, West Virginia was originally a "rep-
lica" state in that it substantially patterned its rules of civil procedure after the
Federal Rules. 198 Since 1986, the year of Professor Oakley's initial study, the
West Virginia Supreme Court has adopted amendments in step with the Federal
Rules commensurate with the national trend, if not ahead.199
190 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 9.1-9.53, at 46-80
(Wright ed., 1960).
191 See Oakley, supra note 21, at 384.
192 Id. at 383.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
at 356-57.
196 Idaho, Mississippi, and Nevada. Id.
19 Utah. Oakley, supra note 21, at 374.
198 Id.
199 See id. Notably, West Virginia has adopted 69% of the amendments that were adopted by
the Federal Rules between 1980 and 2000. See id. at 387, app. tbl. 3. The only significant provi-
sions that West Virginia failed to adopt were mandatory disclosure and the waiver-of-service
provisions in 1993. Id.
[Vol. I113192
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B. West Virginia Adheres to Conley
In 2007, Justice Stevens cited twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia that all follow Conley's "no set of facts" language.200 The West Vir-
ginia Supreme has followed Conley since 1977.201 In Mandolidis v. Elkins In-
dustries, Inc. ,202 the West Virginia Supreme Court articulated the philosophy:
All that the pleader is required to do is to set forth sufficient
information to outline the elements of his claim or to permit
inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. The trial court
should not dismiss a complaint merely because it doubts that
the plaintiff will prevail in the action, and whether the plaintiff
can prevail is a matter properly determined on the basis of proof
and not merely on the pleadings.203
Accordingly, the Court sustained the plaintiffs complaint which alleged
"that the defendant deliberately, intentionally, wilfully [sic] and wantonly al-
lowed employees, including plaintiffs decedent, to work in conditions which
were in violation of the aforementioned laws, rules and regulations, and that the
proximate result of such deliberate, intentional wilful [sic] and wanton miscon-
duct was the death of plaintiffs decedent." 204 "Taken collectively, it is clear
that the Supreme Court of Appeals has approved a liberal standard for evaluat-
ing the adequacy of pleading. This, in turn, is consistent with a provision of
Rule 8 which provides that '[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do sub-
stantial justice."' 205
West Virginia University College of Law Professor Dale P. Olson has
observed,
[T]he Supreme Court of Appeals has elected to follow a course
which, in regard to pleading, assures that an action is deter-
mined so far as possible on the merits of the cause of action, not
on the technical compliance with rules of procedure. Pleading
200 Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, Wyoming, and other states with similar language. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 n.5 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
201 See Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., 236 S.E.2d 207, 212 (W. Va. 1977) ("A rule for testing
the sufficiency of a complaint when challenged by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
has been well defined by the United States Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-
46 (1957)....").
202 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
203 Id. at 920.
204 Id.
205 DALE P. OLSON, MODERN CIVIL PRACTICE IN WEST VIRGINIA 90 (The Michie Co. 1984).
193
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is ideally designed for an uncomplicated and nontechnical
approach inasmuch as it is supplemented by other provisions of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the discovery rules. It
is clear from the opinions of the Supreme Court of Appeals that
a complaint cannot be dismissed unless the complaint fails to
identify a basis for the institution of a lawsuit such that it forms
the basis for further proceedings designed to elaborate the
grounds and facts underlying the action.2 06
Former West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Franklin D. Cleckley
has noted that, "[s]o long as the opponent is fairly apprised and presented with
the opportunity to contradict, he/she should not lose the merits of his/her posi-
tion by imprecise and less than conclusive pleading." 20 7 Further, "[a]lthough
entitlement to relief must be shown, a plaintiff is not required to set out facts
upon which the claim is based." 2 0 8 But "[s]ketchy generalizations of a conclu-
sive nature unsupported by operative facts do not set forth a cause of action.
However, conclusory allegations of fact or law in a pleading are permitted,
when the allegations provide fair notice of the claim to the defendant." 20 9
The picture that emerges from the West Virginia literature is that al-
though the West Virginia Supreme Court may be familiar with the Twombly
Court's insistence on non-conclusory allegations, the import of plausibility
pleading would be a new idea to its pleading regime.
C. States Reconsidering Conley
As of the publication date of this Note, three states have openly em-
braced Twombly and rejected Conley: Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Dela-
ware. 2 10 Three other jurisdictions have favorably cited aspects of the Twombly
206 Id.at91.
207 FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, ROBIN J. DAVIS & Louis L. PALMER, LITIGATION HANDBOOK ON
WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 177 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter LITIGATION
HANDBOOK] (citing Nellas v. Loucas, 191 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 1972); Marcus v. Holley, 618
S.E.2d 517 (W. Va. 2005)).
208 Id. at 179.
209 Id. at 18 1.
210 See lannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E. 879, 879 (Mass. 2008); Sisney v. Best Inc.,
754 N.W.2d. 804, 804 (S.D. 2008); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 929 (Del. Ch. 2007).
[O]ur nation's high court has now embraced the pleading principle that Dela-
ware courts have long applied, which is that a complaint must plead enough
facts to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff will ultimately be entitled to the re-
lief she seeks. If a complaint fails to do that and instead asserts mere conclu-
sions, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be granted.
Id. (footnote omitted).
194 [Vol. 113
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opinion without adopting it wholesale.2 11 On the other hand, Arizona and Ver-
mont have unequivocally rejected Twombly. 212 A few high courts may soon be
weighing in on Twombly either because their intermediate courts have taken a
position on Twombly213 or because the high courts have already mentioned
214Twombly in their opinions.
The West Virginia Supreme Court has delivered Twombly-Iqbal to the
emergency room, but the issue is not altogether dead. The court has flirted with
the Twombly and Conley standards several times since 2007, reaching seemingly
conflicting results.215 At first, in Highmark West Virginia, Inc., v. Jamie, the
Court appeared to reject Twombly, saying,
211 See Chamberlain v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 931 A.2d 1018, 1022-23 (D.C. 2007) (following
Twombly's legal conclusions language but not adopting plausibility pleading); Bean v. Cummings,
939 A.2d 676, 680-81 (Me. 2008) (employing Twombly's policy considerations to decide that
civil perjury constitutes fraud within the meaning of Rule 9); Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744
N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Twombly's "legal conclusions" language).
212 Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 344 (Ariz. 2008); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc.,
955 A.2d 1082, 1082 (Vt. 2008) (rejecting Twombly insofar as it changes the pleading standard).
213 See W. Innovations, Inc., v. Sonitrol Corp., 187 P.3d 1155, 1157 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing
Twombly favorably for the proposition that the court need not accept legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations); Tuban Petroleum, L.L.C., v. SIARC, Inc., 11 So. 3d 519, 523 (La. Ct. App.
2009) (citing Twombly favorably for the "formulaic recitation" language in the context of an anti-
trust action); Williams v. Ohio Edison, CV-644806, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4786, *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 29, 2009) (applying the Twombly standard); Gallo v. Westfield Nat'l Ins. Co., CV-
652376, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 879, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. March 12, 2009); Hermosa Holdings,
Inc., v. Mid-Tennessee Bone & Joint Clinic, No. M2008-00597-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 282, *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 16, 2009) (applying Twombly); W. Express, Inc. v.
Brentwood Servs., 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 707, *25-29 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2009). But see
Crum v. Johns Manville, Inc., 19 So. 3d 208, 212 n.12 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (refusing to adopt
Twombly without holding from the Supreme Court); Thomas v. Williams, CV-07-900093, 2008
Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 731, *3-4 (Ala. Civ. App. Nov. 21, 2008) (rejecting the Twombly standard
with deference to the Alabama Supreme Court precedent); Morana v. City of San Bernardino,
2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4165, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2009) (quoting the "right to
relief above the speculative level" language with approval in an unpublished opinion); Holleman
v. Aiken, 668 S.E.2d 579, 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt Twombly because it lacks
authority to overturn North Carolina Supreme Court precedent); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank,
193 P.3d 155, 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) ("Accordingly, we are without authority to adopt a
standard for claim dismissal different from the one previously announced by our Supreme
Court.").
214 See State v. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 n.1 (Ind. 2008); Highmark W.
Va., Inc., v. Jamie, 655 S.E.2d 509, 513 n.4 (W. Va. 2007); Hoover v. Moran, 662 S.E.2d 711,
715 n.3 (W. Va. 2008); In re Flood Litig. Coal River Watershed, 668 S.E.2d 203, 216 n.10 (W.
Va. 2008); Robinson v. Pack, 679 S.E.2d 660, 669 n.24 (W. Va. 2009).
215 See, e.g., Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-236 (W. Va. June 8, 2010) (per curiam)
(applying Chapman-Conley), available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/docs/Springl0/
34805.pdf; Robinson, 679 S.E.2d at 660 (applying Chapman-Conley); Hill v. Stowers, 680 S.E.2d
66 (W. Va. 2009) (per curiam) (same); In re Flood Litig. Coal River Watershed, 668 S.E.2d 203
(W. Va. 2008) (per curiam) (applying Twombly); Sturm v. Bd. of Educ., 672 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va.
2008) (applying Chapman-Conley); Forshey v. Jackson, 671 S.E.2d 748 (W. Va. 2008) (same);
Hoover v. Moran, 662 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 2008) (per curiam) (clarifying Highmark); Highmark
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We decline to preemptively settle that issue in this opinion. The
standard expressed in Chapman and repeated in subsequent cas-
es remains good law, and we note that shortly after the decision
in Bell Atlantic, this Court . .. applied a standard similar to that
in Chapman in the context of reviewing an order granting
216judgment upon the pleadings.
Thus, even though Chapman and Conley remain good law, the court declined to
preemptively settle the issue.217
After Highmark, it was unclear what the court intended to say about
Twombly. One academic understood the court to say that "West Virginia
adopt[ed] Conley's standard but refrain[ed] to preemptively settle Twombly's
impact on that standard." 2 18 Accepting that view, the Twombly rule is not totally
out because many courts have commented that Twombly is not inconsistent with
Conley and is, therefore, not limited by Conley.21 9 Another academic believed
that Highmark represented an explicit rejection of Twombly. 220
The court clarified its Highmark comment in Hoover v. Moran, where it
stated, "[fjor the purposes of the decision in this case, we need not decide
whether this court will adopt the Twombly standard."2 2 ' Hence, following
Hoover, it appeared that the court was going to continue to apply Chapman-
Conley without a definitive decision on whether it was indeed the proper stan-
dard until a case came along in which the applicable standard made a difference
in the outcome.
The court's dicta gained momentum. Whereas the court declined to
consider Twombly in earlier opinions, in In re Flood Litigation Coal River Wa-
tershed, the court considered the plaintiffs complaint in light of the Twombly
standard.2 22 But the court's analysis was not central to its holding because it
came to the same result under Twombly and Conley, saying, "[a]lthough this
W. Va., Inc. v. Jamie, 655 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 2007) (per curiam) (declining to preemptively
settle the impact of Twombly).
216 Highmark, 655 S.E.2d at 513 n.4.
217 Id
218 Josephson, supra note 7, at 867 n.18.
219 See, e.g., Siemens Fin. Servs. v. Stonebridge Equip. Leasing, LLC, C.A. No. PB 09-1677,
2009 R.I. Super. LEXIS 147 (R.I. Super. Nov. 24, 2009) (adopting Twombly, but insisting that it
doesn't actually change the pleading standard in Conley) (citing Eigerman v. Putnam Invs., Inc.,
877 N.E.2d 1258, 1263 (Mass. 2007); Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc., v. State Election
Bd., 654 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 2007); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, 193 P.3d 155, 155 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2008); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1082 (Vt. 2008)).
220 Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contem-
porary Politics ofJudicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245 n.25 (2008) ("[S]ome state
courts have stated explicitly that Twombly would not cause them to change their states' pleading
standards." (citing Highmark, 655 S.E.2d 509 n.4)).
221 Hoover v. Moran, 662 S.E.2d at 715 n.3 (citing Highmark, 655 S.E.2d 509, 513 n.4).
222 In Re Flood Litig. Coal River Watershed 668 S.E.2d at 216.
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Court has not considered whether such a standard should be adopted, the Coal
River plaintiffs' complaint clearly meets that standard." 2 2 3  Therefore, even
though the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals continues to cite Conley
and Chapman as espousing the applicable standard,224 there can be no inference
that continued reliance on Conley is a rejection of Twombly by implication be-
cause the West Virginia Supreme Court has expressly declined to settle the is-
sue. Moreover, the court has even acknowledged the new federal pleading stan-
dard in light of the Iqbal opinion.225
Recently, the court delivered Twombly a hard blow, but once again, like
in Highmark, without a knock-out punch.2 26 The language of the majority opi-
nion in Roth v. DeFelicecare, Inc., although harsh, still leaves a sliver of room
for Twombly-Iqbal to make another appearance. The court cited the Chapman
standard, as it had done many times in recent opinions. 2 27 However, in footnote
four, the court went on to note that,
our interpretation of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is
more liberal than what is allowed under the federal rules ....
[U]nder the federal rules, more than a notice pleading is
required insofar as a plaintiff is required to plead facts to show
that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief.
Under West Virginia law, however, this Court has not adopted
the more stringent pleading requirements as has been the case in
federal court and all that is required by a plaintiff is "fair
,,228
notice.
The court thus generalized the state of West Virginia's pleading standard, say-
ing that it is more liberal than the federal standard, but it did not expressly de-
cline or reject Twombly-Iqbal. While the language is critical of Twombly-Iqbal,
it is still possible that the court is merely repeating its position from Highmark
and Hoover. There are three reasons why this language may be read in this way.
223 Id. at 216 n.10.
224 See cases cited supra note 215.
225 See Robinson v. Pack, 679 S.E.2d 660, 669 n.24 (W. Va. 2009). In Robinson, the Iqbal
opinion was useful to the court's analysis on other issues, namely supervisory liability for civil
rights violations. However, the court did go on to acknowledge Iqbal's analysis of Twombly, even
leaving out its typical qualification that it "decline[s] preemptively to settle that issue." Id.
226 Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-236, 2010 WL 2346248 (W. Va. June 8, 2010) (per
curiam) (applying Chapman-Conley); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-236, 2010 WL
2346248 (W. Va. June 8, 2010) (Ketchum, J., dissenting) (applying Twombly-Iqbal).
227 Id.
228 Id. at *5 n.4 (citing State ex rel McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick. Inc., 461 S.E.2d
516, 522 (1995)).
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First, the opinion is per curiam, implying that the court decided the case
without holding on new points of law. 2 29 Because it is a per curiam opinion, the
state of the law before the opinion is probably the state of the law after the opi-
nion. As discussed above, the state of the law before the opinion was that the
court had declined to preemptively settle the issue of whether to adopt or reject
Twombly-Iqbal. Under In re Flood Litigation and Hoover v. Moran, the West
Virginia Supreme Court refused to continue citing Chapman as precedent, but it
was not going to settle preemptively the impact of Twombly-Iqbal upon Rule
12(b)(6) motions until a case arose where the standard was outcome-
determinative. In other words, the state of the law under Twombly-Iqbal was on
hold. Through that filter, it is fair to interpret the Roth opinion as saying merely
that the present state of the law is Chapman-Conley, although it reserves its final
decision until the right case comes along. Therefore, when the court states, "this
Court has not adopted the more stringent pleading requirements," it is quite
possible that the court has not closed the window on adopting it later.
Second, if the court was trying to change the law, it did so unprompted.
The lower court applied the same legal standard as the West Virginia Supreme
Court, i.e., Chapman-Conley, only requiring a review of the application of the
standard. 230 Neither the appellant nor the appellee addressed Twombly-Iqbal in
their briefs.23 1 Moreover, the language was not essential to the court's holding.
Justice Ketchum, although disagreeing with the majority about the outcome, felt
that the outcome of this case did not turn upon which standard was applied.2 32
Thus, the language in Roth is a persuasive cue about what the court will do
should the issue ever arise. However, for now, it remains dictum.
Finally, Justice Benjamin has directly stated that the West Virginia Su-
preme Court has yet to squarely address the question of whether to adopt
Twombly-Iqbal. While declining to comment on how he might decide, Justice
Benjamin has shown signs that he may be willing to join in rejecting Twombly-
Iqbal.23 3 In the most searching analysis of Twombly-Iqbal yet in West Virginia
229 Id. at *1. In the past the West Virginia Supreme Court has suggested that any language
outside the syllabus points of a per curiam opinion is obiter dicta. See Lieving v. Hadley, 423
S.E.2d 600, 604 n.4 (W. Va. 1992) (abrogated by Walker v. Doe, 558 S.E.2d 290 (W. Va. 2001)).
Recently, however, the Court has recognized that per curiam opinions have precedential value,
disagreeing with the Lieving Court's conclusion that everything outside the syllabus points is
obiter dicta. See Walker, 558 S.E.2d at 294. Nevertheless, the Court "wholeheartedly" agrees that
"if rules of law or accepted ways of doing things are to be changed, then this Court will do so in a
signed opinion, not a per curiam opinion." Id. at 296 n.16 (quoting Lieving, 423 S.E.2d at 604
n.4).
230 See Roth, 2010 WL 2346248, at *4.
231 See Brief for Appellant, Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-236, 2010 WL 2346248 (W.
Va. Cir., Oct. 16, 2008) (per curiam); Brief for Appellee, Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-
236, 2010 WL 2346248 (W. Va. Cir., Oct. 16, 2008) (per curiam).
232 See Roth, 2010 WL 2346248 (Ketchum, J., dissenting).
233 See Roth, No. 08-C236 (Benjamin, J., dissenting), available at
http://www.state.wv.us/wvscaldocs/SpringI0/34805d2.htm. The portions of the opinion which
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jurisprudence, Justice Benjamin flatly stated, "[a]s noted by the majority herein,
the Conley standard, though it has now been abrogated by the United States
Supreme Court, apparently remains viable in West Virginia-at least for
now." 234
To summarize, Twombly-Iqbal is down, but not out, in the West Virgin-
ia Supreme Court. Every time the court has looked at the issue, it has ultimately
run back to Chapman-Conley, and it has ultimately decided for the plaintiff.
Twombly-Iqbal is probably on hold, but it is definitely disfavored. It is therefore
likely that the West Virginia Supreme Court will not join Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and South Dakota in embracing plausibility pleading.
D. West Virginia Should Not Adopt Twombly-Iqbal
Before the West Virginia Supreme Court buries Twombly-Iqbal, there
are many issues that merit consideration: West Virginia's history with pleading
procedure, timing, and ultimately a review of the success of Twombly-Iqbal in
the federal system and other states. First, Twombly-Iqbal would represent a
significant break with West Virginia's settled understanding and expectations
for pleading and is, therefore, a step too far. Second, even if the West Virginia
Supreme Court decides to adopt Twombly-Iqbal, now is not the time. Finally, a
review of the relevant authorities discloses a sea of criticism of Twombly-Iqbal
in the federal system which cannot lightly be ignored. The West Virginia Su-
preme Court should heed these well-founded criticisms.
1. West Virginia Should Not Adopt Twombly-Iqbal Based Upon
Its History
The West Virginia Supreme Court of abandoned code pleading with the
adoption of the Rules, yet Twombly-Iqbal would signal a detour back in that
direction. Particularly, Twombly-Iqbal's most influential addition to modem
pleading has been in its prohibition on alleging "legal conclusions," harkening
of the code pleading conclusions. But states sought to abandon code pleading
because the distinction between conclusions, evidence, and ultimate facts was
one of degree, not of type. 23 5 The Iqbal decision itself illustrates the confusion
that marred fact pleading. Iqbal was decided by a threadbare majority (5-4).236
The Court lost two members of the deciding majority from Twombly, Justices
lead this author to believe that Justice Benjamin would join in rejecting Twombly-Iqbal are dis-
cussed infra in Part IV(D)(3).
234 Id.
235 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading
Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 520-21 (1957)).
236 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (2009).
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Breyer and Souter, largely because of differences about how the Twombly rule
applied to that case in particular.237
West Virginia has a particular affection for the liberal ethos of the
Rules. First, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the Federal
Rules on the understanding that the Rules had the type of liberal effect that was
characteristic of the time, forming a basis for the bargain. The Court modeled
its rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules,238 and Rule 8(a) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure (the West Virginia Rules) copied Rule 8(a)(2)
of the Federal Rules verbatim. 23 9 The West Virginia Rules took effect in 1960,
a time at which the liberal thrust of federal pleading was at its apex, only three
years after the Conley decision. 2 40 Before the rules took effect, Professors Mar-
lyn E. Lugar and Lee Silverstein published a text comparing the West Virginia
Rules to the Federal Rules "to guide the practitioner quickly through the new
rules of procedure .... 241 In that text, Lugar and Silverstein cite Judge Clark's
opinion in Dioguardi as one of the West Virginia Supreme Court's influences
regarding the amount of fact matter sufficient to withstand a motion to dis-
miss.242
The Reporters' Original Notes to the West Virginia Rules make it clear
that the West Virginia Supreme Court intended to adopt the liberal interpretation
of pleadings that was about to reach its height in the late 1950s, saying, "A mo-
tion to dismiss ... would be appropriate where it is obvious from the complaint
that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim, i.e., where the complaint has omitted
an essential element of the cause of action." 24 3 The Reporters' comment es-
pouses the type of liberal notice pleading doctrine first articulated by Justice
Clark in Dioguardi in that the comment's emphasis is upon the legal sufficiency
of the claim, saying nothing about factual sufficiency. Of particular relevance
was the Reporters' choice to name the ground for a 12(b)(6) dismissal-
omission of an element of the cause of action. This ground for dismissal is ex-
plained as if it were the exclusive ground for a motion to dismiss because of the
237 See generally id. at 1954-62. Justice Breyer, writing a strong dissent in which three other
justices Justices joined, argued that "the majority's holding that the statements it selects are con-
clusory cannot be squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as non-
conclusory." Id. at 1961.
238 See Oakley, supra note 21, at 357. The West Virginia Rules took effect on July 1, 1960.
See LUGAR, supra note 40, at vii.
239 Compare W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8(a) with FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The subsection is different in
West Virginia because the West Virginia rules do not require a statement of jurisdiction, although
the Reporter's Original Note to subdivision (a) suggests, "[o]f course, jurisdiction must still exist,
and although plaintiff need not assert that jurisdiction does exist, defendant may raise the question
by motion under Rule 12(b)." See LUGAR, supra note 40, at vii.
240 See LUGAR, supra note 40, at vii.
241 See LUGAR, supra note 40, at xv.
242 See id. at 75 ("Even a complaint drawn by a layman will suffice if it shows facts entitling
him to relief.") (citing Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 774 (2d Cir. 1944)).
243 LUGAR, supra note 40, at 97.
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resort to the phrase "i.e." and not "e.g." Of course, even accepting this language
as authoritative, it is possible to read it consistently with the Twombly opinion in
the sense that a plaintiff "omits" an element by failing to plead plausible facts.
But such a reading is a stretch of the natural reading of the term "omit." As
typically used, the term "omit" implies that the thing omitted was completely
neglected, such that it was not even mentioned.2 44 Under the most natural un-
derstanding of the Reporters' Notes, therefore, the West Virginia Supreme
Court's emphasis in adopting Rule 8 was upon testing the legal sufficiency of
claims; factual sufficiency was not even an afterthought.
2. Now Is Not the Time to Adopt Twomby-Iqbal in West Virginia
Even if the West Virginia Supreme Court ultimately makes the decision
to adopt Twombly-Iqbal, there are several reasons that militate in favor of wait-
ing. First, the West Virginia Supreme Court only adopted Conley in the first
instance twenty years after it was decided. In turn, the Court should allow fed-
eral case law to develop Twombly more before it makes the decision to adopt.
Iqbal was a slim 5-4 decision, and the differences between the majority and
dissent, as discussed below, would have palatable effects on the way that
Twombly is understood. Any changes in the Court may upset the balance and
affect future case law.245 With such a strong dissent in Iqbal, it is likely that the
Court will visit this issue again in the near future.
Second, although the judicial branch has embraced Twombly-Iqbal, the
long-term status of Twombly-Iqbal in federal courts is unsettled. Congress con-
sidered legislation that would overturn the effects of Twombly-Iqbal.246 Early
drafts of the legislation, particularly the Notice Pleading Restoration Act, drew
heavy criticism because it merely said that courts should follow the decision in
244 The American Heritage Dictionary ofthe English Language defines "omit" as, "[t]o fail to
include or mention; leave out . . . . To pass over, neglect. . . . To desist or fail in doing; to for-
bear." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed.
2009).
245 Since Iqbal was decided in May of 2009, Justice Souter retired, and Justice Sotomayor
succeeded him to the position. Justice
Souter authored in the 7-2 Twombly majority, and it is uncertain whether Justice Sotomayor will
succeed Justice Souter to support the Twombly majority. Justice Stevens has also retired since
Twombly and Iqbal were decided, but because he already dissented in both Twombly and Iqbal,
his successor, Justice Kagan, does not have the same opportunity as Justice Sotomayor to effect a
shift away from Twombly-Iqbal. One academic has speculated that Justice Kagan would be criti-
cal of Twombly-Iqbal because Justice Kagan was critical of heightened pleading under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act. See Adam Steinman, Reading the Kagan Tea Leaves on Iq-
bal/Twombly, CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL COURTS BLOG (June 22, 2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/twomblyiqbal/.
246 See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); 155 CONG. REC.
S7891 (Dailey ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Spectar); Open Access to Courts Act of 2009,
H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Conley, and it is possible to read Conley as consistent with Twombly. 247 It is a
sign that the initiative was purely symbolic and that Congress and Senator Spec-
ter were merely expressing their disagreement with the Iqbal opinion. But sub-
sequent developments suggest that Congress may someday consider this issue
seriously. The House's bill, the Open Access to Courts Act, does more than
refer to the Conley opinion; it carefully defines the proper standard, quoting the
"no set of facts" language directly, and it makes clear that complaints will not be
dismissed because they state an implausible entitlement to relief.2 4 8 In light of
the uncertainty in Twombly's future in the federal courts, State adoption would
be hasty if the goal is to pattern after the civil procedure of the federal courts so
that there is "one procedure for state and federal courts."
Third, among the twenty-six states that adhered to Conley at the time of
the Twombly opinion, only five have arrived at a decision about whether to
adopt it. 24 9 Further, only a handful of others have employed various aspects of
Twombly.250 The remaining states have judicially recognized that Twombly is
floating around in the academic ether, but they have not made a decision about
whether to adopt it or have expressly declined to do so. 2 5 1 Although Twombly
citations carry a type of intellectual cache, as evidenced by the immense number
of citing cases since 2007, there has thus been astonishingly little legal devel-
opment. In fact, all states that have considered the issue did so before 2009 and
the Iqbal opinion, and, in particular, before the subsequent legislative backlash.
Ultimately, there is an ironic theme that runs through the timing analy-
sis. Although the Court's purpose in writing Iqbal may have been to put to rest
uncertainty about Twombly, by closing the door, the Court inflamed a wave of
dissent that casts a new veil of uncertainty about its future at the hands of Con-
gress. Until this issue is settled, state courts should hold back on making final
decisions.
3. Twombly-Iqbal Does Not Strike the Proper Balance Among
Competing Policy Interests
The Twombly opinion has inspired a number of academics to write in
opposition or defense, and there is a rich national debate about the competing
policy interests. But time is proving that Twombly is not achieving its goals,
and Twombly criticism has the upper hand in the debate. The West Virginia
Supreme Court should hear those criticisms and recognize that Twombly-Iqbal
will not achieve its goals with respect to plaintiffs or the judiciary.
247 Bahar Dejban, Will the Notice Pleading Restoration Act be Enough?, CONSUMER ADVOCATE
LEGAL UPDATE (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.consumeradvocatelegalupdate.com/tags/notice-
pleading-restoration-ac/.
248 Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
249 See cases cited supra Part IV(C).
250 Id.
251 Id.
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There are three types of plaintiffs that are affected by plausibility plead-
ing. First, there are plaintiffs who know that they have a plausible claim but
inadvertently fail to file a plausible pleading. Second, there are plaintiffs who
know that they do not have a plausible claim but file an action to seek an in ter-
rorem settlement. And finally, there are plaintiffs who do not know whether
they have a plausible claim but file an action to gain access to discovery.
First, for plaintiffs who know that they have plausible claims but inad-
vertently fail to file a plausible pleading, dismissal is granted under Twombly
purely for procedural reasons, not substantive reasons. Dismissal on purely
procedural grounds is against the spirit with which the Federal Rules were
adopted. As noted above, Judge Clark reflected the Advisory Committee's sen-
timent when he urged rules of procedure should be the "hand maid and not the
mistress of justice." 25 2 For such plaintiffs, Twombly is unnecessary.
Second, with regard to plaintiffs who seek in terrorem settlements, the
Twombly rule has not yet achieved its policy goals. The Twombly Court articu-
lated a new plausibility standard in response to what it perceived to be a rising
cost of litigation and the weaponization of these costs by plaintiffs to seek an in
terrorem increase in settlement value.253 Subsequent economic analysis by Pro-
fessor Hylton, among others, suggests that heightened pleading may be more
socially desirable with respect to the efficient use of societal resources by dis-
missing claims that fail to satisfy a minimum threshold in merit.25 4 Neverthe-
less, empirical studies have suggested that courts have not dismissed claims at a
statistically different rate since Twombly was decided, except for civil rights
claims.2 55 But civil rights claims were not the true target of the Twombly opi-
nion; indeed, it was sympathy for discrimination claims that gave birth to Con-
ley in the first instance. Rather than achieve its policy goal of reducing in terro-
rem settlements for claims based upon nothing more than conspiracy theories, as
argued in the next paragraph, meritorious claims will be dismissed because
252 See Clark, supra note 28, at 297.
253 See supra Part III(B).
254 See Hylton, supra note 27, at 62.
255 See Kendall W. Hannon, Symposium: Separation of Powers as a Safeguard to Federalism:
Note: Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on
12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1811, 1815 (2008). Perhaps Hylton's model exagge-
rates the effectiveness of a plaintiffs initial prediction of the probability of success as a proxy for
merit. See Hylton, supra note 27, at 47. Of course, federal district courts have been applying
Twombly to West Virginia law since 2007. A brief survey of West Virginia Federal District
Courts turned up only three cases which may have arguably turned on the Twombly standard. See
Holmes v. Runyan & Assoc., Civil Action No. 2:09-0679, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117233 (S.D.
W. Va. Dec. 15, 2009) (dismissing joint venture claim as implausible); Clendenin v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., d/b/a Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Civil Action No. 2:09-cv-00557, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109952 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (dismissing breach of loan agreement for conclusory
factual allegations); Bess v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., Civil Action No. 2:08-cv-01020, 2009
U.S. Dist. Lexis, 85006 *33 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2009) (dismissing negligent hiring claim as
conclusory which read, "[d]efendants are also liable for negligent hiring, retention, and supervi-
sion of its [sic] employees").
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plaintiffs commonly do not know and should not be required to know whether
their claim has merit until they can reach discovery.
Finally, for plaintiffs who do not know the merit of their claims upon
filing, as Professor Spencer has argued, dismissal of such claims moves civil
procedure away from its intended liberal ethos toward a restrictive ethos. 2 5 6 Of
course, this is not a new concern. As early as 1986, when pre-Leatherman judi-
cial pleading standards were on the rise, it was observed that
where the plaintiff is unable to provide details because only the
defendant possesses such information, no such confidence is
possible. To the contrary, it may be that the defendant has so
effectively concealed his wrongdoing that the plaintiff can un-
earth it only with discovery. To insist on details as a prerequi-
site to discovery is putting the cart before the horse.257
Offending the rule's liberal ethos would be particularly egregious in the
West Virginia because the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted the Federal
Rules at a time when notice pleading was at its apex, and it has always espoused
a particularly liberal perspective of its pleading rules.2 58  Twombly would
represent a break from that history.
Responding to the recent federal case law, the 2009 supplement to the
Litigation Handbook on West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure argues:
The intent of notice pleading is to ensure that a claim is deter-
mined on its merits and not tossed out of court through missteps
in pleading. Requiring a plaintiff to plead detailed facts inter-
feres with that goal in several ways. First, as a general matter
the number of potentially relevant factual details in a case is as-
tronomical. Therefore, requiring a plaintiff to plead facts that
are not obviously important and easy to catalogue would result
in needless controversies about what is required, which would
256 See Spencer, supra note 9, at 479. Professor Spencer argues,
The Twombly standard is troubling because, in relying on such concerns, the
Court appears to have exalted goals of sound judicial administration and effi-
ciency above the original core concern of the rules: progressive reform in fa-
vor of expanding litigant access to justice. Thus I believe what we are witness-
ing is simply the latest and perhaps final chapter in a long saga that has moved
the federal civil system from a liberal to a restrictive ethos.
Id.
257 See Spencer, supra note 9, at 482 (quoting Marcus, supra note 43, at 468).
258 See supra Part IV(B). Liberal opinions like Dioguardi and Conley from the 1950s formed a
basis of the bargain to adopt the Federal Rules. Whereas West Virginia adopted its rules in 1960,
some of the other courts which have jettisoned Conley, like South Dakota, had adopted their rules
before the rise of liberal notice pleading. Compare S.D. Codified Laws § 15-6-8(a) (adopted in
1939) with W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8 (adopted in 1960). But see MAss. R. Civ. P. 8 (adopted in 1973).
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serve only to delay or prevent trial. Most factual details of [a]
case are more efficiently learned through the flexible discovery
process. Second, a plaintiff might sometimes have a right to re-
lief without knowing every factual detail supporting his/her
right. Thus, requiring a plaintiff to plead unknown details be-
fore discovery would improperly deny the plaintiff the opportu-
nity to prove his/her claim. Encouraging a plaintiff to plead
what few facts can be easily provided and will clearly be help-
ful, serves to expedite resolution of a case by quickly alerting
the defendant to the basic, but critical factual allegations.259
Therefore, with respect to any type of plaintiff, criticism of Twombly-Iqbal is
well-founded.
Twombly is also impractical to implement in the judiciary. The confu-
sion first noted by the Second Circuit has not been resolved by the Court's clari-
fication in Iqbal.260 First, plausibility will be conflated with the particularity
requirement of Rule 9 because "it is hard to distinguish the Court's plausibility
standard from the heightened pleading obligation of Rule 9(b)." 261 Second, in
weighing plausibility, judges are to consider "judicial experience and common
sense," but at the same time, a judge must accept the truth of an allegation even
if it is "doubtful in fact." 2 62 How much deference should a judge accord an alle-
gation when it conflicts with her judicial experience and common sense?
Whether the answer in a particular case is within case law or a matter of case-
by-case discretion, such a standard would breed mass uncertainty resulting in
both judicial inefficiency and abuse.
The Iqbal opinions illustrate the uncertainty. The majority's decision
relied upon a common sense understanding that the targeting of Arab Muslims
could be either because of discriminatory intent or, alternatively, because of a
legitimate intent to retain members of society who fit the profile of the Septem-
ber 11th perpetrators.263 Yet the dissent argued that the majority did not suffi-
ciently accord the weight of truth to the allegations. 264 To Justice Souter, plau-
sibility would dismiss "claims about little green men, or the plaintiffs recent trip
to Pluto, or experiences in time travel."2 65 But unless a complaint reflects an
259 LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 207, at 14 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs.,
Inc., 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007)).
260 For example, one court has recently held that Twombly requires a plaintiff to identify the
statute he or she is relying upon. See Chappey v. Ineos USA LLC, No. 2:08-CV-271, 2009 WL
790194 (N.D. Ind., March 23, 2009).
261 See Spencer, supra note 9, at 474.
262 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
263 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _ U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009).
264 Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting).
265 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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example of Justice Souter's alien encounters, in the wake of Iqbal, it is unclear
how judges will apply common sense and experience to test complaints.
The potential unpredictability of Twombly-Iqbal is not lost on members
of the West Virginia Supreme Court. Justice Benjamin foreshadows the loom-
ing debate in his dissenting opinion from the Roth majority.266 At first, Justice
Benjamin admonishes the Court that it would be "foolish to simply stick its
judicial head in the sand" with respect to the reasons which gave rise to the
adoption of Twombly-Iqbal in federal courts. But after showing his respects
to the federal judiciary, Justice Benjamin went on to explain that he was "not
certain that a 'plausibility' standard at the initial pleading level is necessarily a
good thing . . . .,268 As argued in this section, Justice Benjamin's misgivings for
Twombly-Iqbal are based upon the recognition that the standard "is certainly
dependent on the legal and factual context of a given controversy" which "re-
quire[s] a judge to make a value determination" about the likelihood of success
in discovery.269 To Justice Benjamin, such value determinations are not neces-
sarily a good thing because "each judge has a different level of experience in
making such determinations."27 0
Perhaps the most persuasive reason not to adopt Twombly-Iqbal is im-
plied by the disagreement among the Roth opinions about whether the factual
detail of the complaints would satisfy Twombly-Iqbal. While the majority de-
clined to consider Twombly-Iqbal, Justices Ketchum and Benjamin addressed
the question head-on and reached different conclusions. Justice Ketchum be-
lieved that the factual detail would be sufficient to satisfy the Twombly-Iqbal
standard, but Justice Benjamin believed it would not.27 1 How can the Court
expect trial judges to achieve any greater consistency than the seasoned arbiters
of justice on the benches of the highest courts in West Virginia and the United
States?
Twombly's failures notwithstanding, the issues that motivated the Court
are real, and courts need a device to weed out meritless claims. But there are
better options. Professor Spencer has suggested that Rules 11, 16, and 26 (as
amended in 2000), along with summary judgment in Rule 56, already provide
courts with the tools they need.272 Justice Benjamin has likewise suggested that
these mechanisms address, at least in part, those concerns.273 If these problems
266 Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-23 (W. Va. June 8, 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissenting).
267 Id. Justice Benjamin lists the reasons which gave rise to the adoption of Twombly-Iqbal:
"[c]ase delays, litigation costs, costly procedures, and the like." Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See Spencer, supra note 9, at 485-86.
273 Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., No. 08-C-23 (W. Va. June 8, 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissenting).
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are real and persistent, then experience has already shown that changing the
pleading rules will not help. Perhaps it is time to revisit those devices.
To summarize, when considering whether to adopt the Twombly formu-
la, the West Virginia Supreme Court should weigh competing policy interests
that compel its rejection. Twombly would represent a break with West Virgin-
ia's history of a liberal pleading regime. The case law and legislative responses
are not yet settled, so now is not the time to adopt Twombly. Twombly contra-
dicts the liberal thrust of the rules for plaintiffs who make procedural errors.
Twombly is ineffective against plaintiffs with in terrorem claims. Twombly is
unfair to plaintiffs who do not know the merit of their claims. Finally, Twombly
will breed uncertainty in the administration of justice, and there are alternatives
that better effectuate the policy concerns that gave rise to the Twombly opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
Twombly-Iqbal may be on hold in the West Virginia Supreme Court,
but it is definitely disfavored. In fact, by now it is clear that the court has all but
rejected it. Nevertheless, it is an unsettled issue raising many questions. Why
hasn't the West Virginia Supreme Court closed the deal? Why is Twombly still
kicking around its opinions? Why is all the abuse coming from footnotes, per
curiam opinions, dicta, and now, dissenting opinions?
If Twombly-Iqbal is to rise from the ashes, it will have an uphill battle to
overcome the sentiments of judges and academics who bemoan the loss of Con-
ley. West Virginia has a long history of applying pleading rules within the lib-
eral ethos that dominated the federal system when the West Virginia Supreme
Court adopted its rules. It was part of the bargain that gave rise to the West
Virginia Rules.
Even if Twombly-Iqbal is in West Virginia's future, now is not the time
to make that change. The law is unsettled, and Congress may be rolling back
some of those changes. The West Virginia Supreme Court should allow the law
to settle before making a decision.
Finally, Twombly presents many challenges in judicial administration.
The stakes are high. Applied aggressively, Twombly could signify the end of an
era of open access to the courts and discovery. The impact will not be felt by
plaintiffs who bring conspiracy theories based on trips to Mars-those plain-
tiffs' claims would have been dismissed through summary judgment anyway.
Rather, it will affect plaintiffs who have been wronged but can bring nothing
more than neutral facts consistent with both actionable and innocent conduct.
The early studies already suggest that Twombly most significantly affects civil
rights claims, not the anti-trust conspiracies that gave rise to plausibility plead-
ing in the first place. The standard is also vague, leading to uncertainty in the
administration of justice. What are the limits to the types of judicial experience
and common sense that judges should consider? Justices Kennedy and Souter
had differences in Iqbal, Justices Ketchum and Benjamin had differences in
Roth, and the vagueness will continue to plague honest courts trying to adminis-
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ter justice equally. Plaintiffs, in the wake of this uncertainty, necessarily have a
new incentive to plead more facts, not just to assure that the elements are cov-
ered, but to be sure that the judge is thoroughly convinced that the claim has
sufficient merit. This will come at considerable expense in investigating some
cases before filing a complaint, and plaintiffs may be left without courtroom
access because of pre-filing costs. This is the future of pleadings under Twom-
bly-Iqbal.
Mistakes that were made at the federal level need not be repeated by
states like West Virginia; it is unsound to retire fifty years of solid jurispru-
dence. The stakes are particularly high in West Virginia-citizens have a reme-
dy through Congress to amend the Federal Rules, but citizens are without re-
course to influence the rulemaking process politically in West Virginia.274 West
Virginians now may only ponder: which way will these country roads lead?
Devon J. Stewart*
274 See W. Va. Const. art. VIII, §3 (amended 1974).
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